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Abstract
Hypercomputation refers to computation surpassing the Turing model, not just exceeding the
von Neumann architecture. Algebraic constructions yield a $nitely based pseudorecursive equa-
tional theory (Internat. J. Algebra Comput. 6 (1996) 457–510). It is not recursive, although for
each given number n, its equations in n variables form a recursive set. Hypercomputation is
therefore required for an algorithmic answer to the membership problem of such a theory. Yet
Alfred Tarski declared these theories to be decidable. The dilemma of a decidable but not re-
cursive set presents an impasse to standard computability theory. One way to break the impasse
is to predicate that the theory is computable—in other words, hypercomputation by de$nition.
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Preface
A. I. Mal’tsev’s work inspired the hunt for pseudorecursive varieties, and
Alfred Tarski’s encouragement led to publishing the ,ndings. Although the heir of a
two-,gure fortune, I am still a beginner at transcending duality.
1. Introduction
We consider here computability problems on the boundary between logic and algebra.
For simplicity we $x the algebraic type as one binary operation + and two individual
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constants a, b. Using these symbols and an in$nite supply of variables vi (i∈N, the
set of natural numbers), we can specify logical terms as algebraic expressions, such
as v1 + v2 or b + (b + v17). A formal equation (or identity) is a string composed
of two terms separated by the formal equality sign ≈, such as a + v3 ≈ v3 + a. An
equational theory of this type is a set T of formal equations including the equation
v1≈ v1 that is closed under these two operations: (a) replacing a subterm t1 appearing in
an equation in T by a term t2 when t1≈ t2 or t2≈ t1 is in the set T , and (b) substituting
a chosen but arbitrary term for every occurrence of a variable in an equation in T . In
high-school algebra, simplifying and factoring are processes that use these two rules
and the identities called the laws of algebra, such as associativity, commutativity, and
distributivity. A subset B of an equational theory T is an equational base for T iG
T is the smallest equational theory that includes B. We write T =Th(B). Thus T is
recursively based just in case T is the closure under (a) and (b) of a $nite set, or an
in$nite recursive 1 set, of equations. The class of algebraic models for an equational
theory is called its variety; thus we also speak of $nitely based varieties.
All examples that we consider are equational theories for varieties of semigroups;
that is, they contain the equation
(v1 + v2) + v3 ≈ v1 + (v2 + v3) (∗)
that guarantees associativity for the + operation. They may also provide a zero ele-
ment by containing the equations 0+ v1≈ 0≈ v1 + 0; here, 0 may be a new individual
constant or a particular term. To continue the analogy with high-school algebra, we are
concerned with validity of algebraic laws such as commutativity rather than $nding so-
lutions of algebraic equations such as x2 = 2. A useful equational theory of semigroups
in computer science is the theory whose only equations are the instances of v1≈ v1
and associativity (∗). This is the theory of nonempty strings over an alphabet of two
letters, also called the theory of the free semigroup on two generators. It has a $nite
base, consisting of (∗) alone.
Let Tn be the subset of an equational theory T consisting of the equations in T in
which no more than n distinct variables appear. Then T is quasirecursive iG for every
number n, Tn is recursive. T is pseudorecursive iG T is quasirecursive but not recursive.
Note that if T is recursively based (in particular, if it is $nitely based), then T will
certainly be recursively enumerable, i.e., listable by a Turing machine (TM).
Various pseudorecursive equational theories were constructed in [45,47] and extended
in [49,51]. According to [47], if we start with a $xed but arbitrary nonrecursive, re-
cursively enumerable set X ⊂N , we can de$ne a $nite equational base 1X from a
highly engineered TM that accepts X . The resulting theory Th(1X ) is an equational
theory of semigroups with zero and $nitely many individual constants (the number of
constants can be reduced to two or one [49], or eliminated [45]). The main result is
quoted here.
1 More traditionally, the set of GNodel numbers of these equations is recursive; that is, its membership can
be decided by a Turing machine.
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Theorem 1.1 (Wells [47], Theorem 10.4). For every nonrecursive r.e. set X ⊂N ,
Th(1X ) is a ,nitely based pseudorecursive equational theory; indeed, Th(1X )≡m X .
I shared the problem of $nding a $nitely based pseudorecursive variety with
Alfred Tarski in 1970. He remained excited about it for a decade, even when I was
not. As noted in [45,47,48], he took the result as an argument for the necessity of
formal language, not only in mathematics, but even in logic itself. Logic discusses
formal languages, but Tarski felt that the use of exact discourse was, paradoxically,
often neglected during that discussion. In 1982, he asked me why I thought he liked
the discovery/construction of $nitely based pseudorecursive theories that I had $nally
written into a dissertation. It turned out he did not have in mind the oft-repeated in-
dispensability of formal language. Instead, he astonished me by asserting: “Because
they are decidable.” In other words, a nonrecursive set was decidable. Did that mean
he thought it was computable? As he described, there would at least be a $nitistic,
mechanistic method for making the decision.
Tarski’s statement is quoted in [45, p. xii–xiv; 47, p. 460–461]. Wells [45–47]
introduce a discussion of his controversial claim that these nonrecursive theories are
decidable and so appear to contradict the Church–Turing Thesis (CTT); Wells [48]
elaborates. 2 The current article, enlarging on Wells [50], discusses the background for
simply declaring $nitely based or, more generally, r.e. pseudorecursive varieties to be
computable (see [48, Section 9]). A mathematical framework for this discussion will
appear in [52].
The following result strengthens Theorem 1.1 inter alia and is needed below. Let P
be the class of problems solvable by deterministic TMs halting in time bounded by
polynomial functions of the length of the input.
Theorem 1.2 (Wells [51], Theorem 3.1). Each pseudorecursive theory Th() dis-
cussed in [45, Section 10] and [49] has Thn()∈P for every n∈N .
2. Mathematical impasse
Let us consider some examples of how mathematics expands.
First, mathematics solves open problems. For some problems, this can take a long
time—witness the recently solved Fermat’s Last Conjecture and the unsolved Rie-
mann hypothesis. Sometimes the $rst solution proves inadequate. The second may
involve a detailed reformulation of previously announced results that presented Saws
or initially unappreciated imprecision. Instances of this include the publication of the
details of Tarski’s decision procedure for real-closed $elds in [42] after its elliptical
2 Tarski’s claim immediately concerned the $nitely based pseudorecursive theories (it also applied to all
recursively based or merely r.e. pseudorecursive theories). He did not mean that the uncountably many
pseudorecursive theories of Theorems 4.6–7 below and Remark 11.2 of [47] are all decidable. This point
is contextually clear but not explicit in [48]. Curiously, his heuristic argument for decidability, given in
[48, Section 5], applies equally well to the constructions from Theorems 4.6–7. This underlines its heuristic
character.
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announcement in [43, Chap. 6], and the revision of Mal’tsev’s partially enunciated
results in Chap. 3 of [31] as Chap. 11 there. 3
There is also another phenomenon in mathematics that demands an answer; it may be
termed an impasse because it asks more for a direction of escape than a solution. There
are two chief approaches to enlarging knowledge in mathematics when confronted by
an impasse.
If the cause of the impasse is an unsolvable problem or construction that carries
beyond the domain in question, then extension is often employed as a resolution. In
many cases, the extension solves the problem by assuming the problem can itself be
abstracted as the answer and moving to the consequences of such a commitment. This
happens when integers are introduced to solve 0− n, rational numbers to solve 1÷ n
(or 1=n), algebraic numbers to solve
√
n, and imaginary numbers to solve
√− n. One
approach oGered in the current context is to assume that pseudorecursiveness is itself
a new kind of computability; see Sections 4 and 5 below.
When the impasse is caused by a confrontation with accepted foundations and results,
then mathematicians often seek to re$ne the context of discussion in order to provide a
harmonizing resolution that oGers insight into both sides of the conSict while disarming
it. The lamination at the saddle of the Lorenz attractor 4 is a suggestive image of
how a monolithic barrier has more ins and outs than can at $rst be conceived. With
the picture of this fractal attractor in mind, let us refer to resolution of this impasse
as delamination. Cases where turbid proposals have settled out as minable strata of
mathematics include: Brouwer’s “intuitive” intuitionism as clari$ed by BHK semantics
and further formalization (see, e.g., Artemov [2]); the Skolem paradox as exempli$ed
by inner models (see, e.g., [26]); set theoretic antinomies as resolved by types and new
axiomatizations (for recent work, see [34]); the problem of individuals as explicated
by beta models [30] and reinvigorated in Jensen’s NFU (see [24]); the legitimation of
in$nitesimals in calculus as achieved by nonstandard models; 5 and semantics for the
lambda calculus as provided by Scott’s function spaces. 6
3 In a similar vein, the series starting with [47] is intended to bridge the lacunae of [45].
4 The Lorenz attractor resembles a butterSy, but has nothing to do with the so-called butterSy eGect
associated with Ed Lorenz’s famous comment on sensitivity to initial conditions. The attractor is formed
from a complex, fractal arrangement of surface patches laminated in a manner resembling $llo pastry. Orbits
of the system near the attractor Sy around one or the other of the two “wings” in apparently random
order, passing repeatedly through the saddle between them. Nearby orbits will quickly diverge into unrelated
sequences of wing circlings. These traces imply an incredibly folded, rami$ed structure at the saddle. See,
e.g., Peitgen et al. [36], but animated $lms and numerous applets on the Web give the best impression of
orbits near the attractor. For nearly four decades, this shape was visualized but lacked proof of existence.
That is, there was no mathematical demonstration that solutions of Lorenz’s diGerential equations can be
chaotic and that the attractor actually takes this fractal form known only through computer visualization.
Finally, Tucker [44] proved it, using a computer; see also Stewart [41].
5 Robinson [39] introduced nonstandard analysis, but it was some years before this ancient vision of
calculus appeared in modern textbooks; see, e.g., [21].
6 The original Scott semantics for the lambda calculus based on the absolute neighborhood retract of a
function space was announced at the 1969 American Mathematical Society winter meeting in Los Angeles.
Later developments in the semantics of the lambda calculus led to Scott–Strachey denotational semantics for
computer programs (see [1,28]).
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But there appears to be a third kind of impasse: when the obstruction is neither the
novelty of the $rst impasse nor the superSuity of the second (that is, no answer or
too many answers), but the matter exhibits profound vagueness and impenetrability,
or internal self-contradiction, perhaps absurdity. A helpful metaphor may be that the
$rst impasse is darkness, the second a kaleidoscope, and the third a duststorm. All
can bene$t from light—that is, elucidation. In the last type, patience can be rewarding.
As an author re$nes his or her position and as the readers broaden their perspectives,
the radical proposal can become acceptably familiar, grounded in realistic models,
and producing insight and novel, useful results. 7 Of course, the proposal may be
simply and resoundingly discredited; even then, there is often a history of fruitful
revisitation. We can see that happening in studies of how close one can come to
solving “unsolvable” problems: e.g., the minimal tools that suUce to trisect an angle,
solve a quintic equation, prove Peano arithmetic consistent. 8 In time, the impasse
may evolve into one of the two earlier types. Real number computability (unrealistic
when uncountable), 9 symbolic integration theory (confusing), 10 the Liar paradox (self-
contradicting), 11 ultraintuitionism (compelling, but profoundly vague) 12 can be argued
to have made the transition. There is no suggestion that these programs have any
7 A version of this stumbling block takes the form of the negation of unprovable but attractive propositions
now shown to be independent. Thus, denying the parallel postulate, the axiom of choice, the axiom of
regularity, and so on, leads to alternative models and mathematics. There is scope not only for conSicting
views but also for provably incompatible visions of the true foundations of some area of mathematics. For
example, GNodel held the Axiom of Choice to be true while intuitionists dismissed the theory of cardinals.
He must have had some regard for the Axiom of Constructibility; many descriptive set theorists (some in
California) support an incompatible form of the Axiom of Determinacy.
8 KalmVar’s proof of Gentzen’s theorem reveals the precise requirement of 0-induction, the weakest possible
tool beyond Peano arithmetic [37].
9 The $rst eGorts to treat real numbers in recursive function theory centered on specifying how to compute
numerical operations when one had computations for their inputs. An advanced form of this approach is given
by Mazur [33]. But Blum et al. [4,5] suggested a solution by extension: take in$nite precision real-number
computers as existing, then see what follows concerning their eGectiveness and programmability.
10 After implementations of promise in the early 1960s, notably Slagle’s SAINT and Moses’ SIN symbolic
integration programs at MIT, the big theoretical breakthrough awaited Risch [38], which both inspired
and confounded. Despite the ubiquitous success of Risch’s analysis in symbolic algebra packages such
as Mathematica, there remained a quest to extract eUcient integration algorithms from practical heuristics
and theoretical decision procedures (see [12,17] for the work of two decades). Risch proposed more than has
been implemented, maybe even understood. Moses [35] gives an inside view of the early history of symbolic
integration. Risch began his work on the integration of elementary functions by tackling a related problem
assigned to him by Tarski. When Risch $rst presented his results at the UC Berkeley Logic Colloquium,
Tarski objected that he had worked on the wrong problem. Users of Mathematica, etc., would disagree;
consult Wolfram [53].
11 Barwise and Etchemendy [3] give two cogent and parallel accounts of the Liar using situation logic and
nonwellfounded sets, which violate Zermelo’s axiom of regularity guaranteeing no set can be a member of
itself.
12 Esenin–Volpin [15,54] proposed a radically $nitistic set theory with the unusual properties that 1010
∧10
is in$nite and that it is possible to prove the consistency of ZFC. But until Geiser and others grounded it in
Ehrenfeucht *-models, modal semantics, fuzzy logic, and other models, there did not seem to be a consistent
way to envision it. See [14,18,25].
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negative aspect or indeed anything in common except for falling under the current
rubric. The $rst two have been handled by extension, the second two by delamination;
all four cases still oGer research opportunities.
Returning to the second form of impasse, we can identify typical tools of delami-
nation as relativization, specialization, and alteration. All seek to restrict the overly
general claims of the original problem or issue to more amenable contexts. Relativiza-
tion results when there is access to additional information, usually about an interesting
subproblem not yet solved (and usually unsolvable). A common form of relativization
in the theory of computability provides a TM with an oracle in the form of an ex-
tra read-only tape. A typical oracle is the listing of a nonrecursive set in numerical
order. 13 The source of the tape is unspeci$ed and not in question. Observe that an ap-
propriate oracular tape can make the decision procedures for the Tn uniform. Thus the
question of a decision procedure for a $nitely based or even just r.e. pseudorecursive
theory (called a “Tarski procedure” in [48]) can be classically reduced to the real or
physical existence of a suitable oracle. Some think that Turing may have speculated
on the possibility of real oracles; see Copeland et al. [11]. This direction goes beyond
mathematics and probably beyond computer science, so no more will be said here.
Specialization involves restricting the focus of the problem within its original do-
main. This often happens in preliminary results in mathematics: the theorem is $rst
proven true for special cases. The question of the Tarski procedure can be recast for
problems at a lower complexity than recursive functions, such as the class P; see [48,
Section 9]; [51, Sections 2 and 4]; [52, Sections 2 and 3]; and Sections 3 and 4 be-
low. Another type of specialization would be to restrict the algebraic properties of
the underlying equational theories. This might result in a proof that pseudorecursive-
ness is impossible in that particular subdomain, eliminating there the search for Tarski
procedures.
Let’s use alteration to mean restating the problem for a context disjoint from the
current setting. Frequently, $rst results do not apply directly to the original scope
of the problem; for example, Julia Robinson (see [13]) showed the class of expo-
nential diophantine problems to be unsolvable, but this provided energy for further
study and foundation for Matiyasevich’s resolution of Hilbert’s tenth problem [32].
The Tarski procedure’s arena is the class of r.e. sets and standard TMs. Moving be-
yond that setting, we can investigate elaborated or expanded domains and machine
capabilities; see Section 4 below. These studies may in turn cast light on the original
quandary.
In the earlier discussion [48] of the character a decision procedure for a pseudorecur-
sive theory might assume, an attempt was made to analyze a hypothetical Tarski pro-
cedure in the light of Cleland’s perspective on quotidian procedures (see also [9,10]).
We can now go a step farther: the problem of formalizing quotidian procedures is an
impasse of the third type probably evolving into the second type, while the problem of
understanding the decidability of $nitely based pseudorecursive theories should be clas-
13 The classic delamination by relativization is the strati$cation of Turing degrees of unsolvability by means
of the jump operator, recently shown to be an intrinsic property of the degree poset (see [27]).
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si$ed as an impasse of the $rst type. 14 Further discussion of quotidianness is beyond
the scope of this article.
3. Four directions
Tarski claimed that decidability should not be identi$ed with recursiveness. For logic,
the interest is whether this is necessarily vacuous or possibly a meaningful extension.
From the point of view of computer science, however, an extension of the notion of
computable function has little interest if there is no corresponding expansion of models
for that computation. In other words, a pure existence proof of added computability
carries little weight, much less an increase in computability by $at—that is, hypercom-
putation by de$nition. To help overcome this, Wells [48, Section 9] identi$ed four areas
for investigation with the corresponding computing regimes (parenthetical references to
terms in Section 2 have been added):
(1) the most general level of abstract computation, as traditionally understood; this is
represented by TMs and directly related to the logician’s concern with recursive
functions (Extension);
(2) a lower level of complexity as determined by restrictions on time or space or
other resources, including applications to the P=NP boundary (if any) or below
(Specialization);
(3) variants based on modern machine capabilities and architectures as exempli$ed by
parallel processing, and on
(4) for now unrealistic extensions of the theory of computation, in particular to real
numbers (Alterations).
Concerning (1), the Church–Turing Thesis has met the test of time, a span a little
short for mathematical history, but long in terms of the history of computing. According
to widely accepted views, there appear to be no computable functions beyond the re-
cursive functions, and no models of general computation that are not Turing-equivalent
to TMs. 15 Nor would more computable functions be welcome to a community with
a strong, close to universal, view that the class of recursive functions is already too
large to model practical computation. (2) The role of feasible computation usually
falls to P, the class of functions whose best sequential deterministic computations can
be bounded in the number of steps by polynomials in the length of their inputs. On
the other hand, Shor’s quantum factoring algorithm [40] proves that substantial exten-
sion of P may be realistically feasible, depending on advances in quantum hardware.
14 This may seem to be contradicted by [48, Section 9], but this claim concerns the original problem of [48,
9.1] and 3.1 below. Either the take-the-problem-as-solution approach of [48, Section 9]; [52, Section 4], and
Sections 3–5 below, or some new, unexpected basis for algorithms that would satisfy Tarski’s doubts—both
constitute resolutions by extension for the $rst type of impasse. The other cases and examples listed in
[48, 9.2–4], 3.2–4, and Section 4 below are mathematical results that illustrate delamination of the Tarski
problem as far as it confronts CTT, but they do not resolve prior impasses themselves.
15 The reader, however, will $nd elsewhere in this volume just such models; some are decades old, such
as the inductive TMs of Burgin [6]. A new example is the work of Kieu [29] on a quantum solver for
diophantine equations. Also see the series [8] edited by Calude et al.
198 B. Wells / Theoretical Computer Science 317 (2004) 191–207
(3) The computer scientists who put the practical ceiling at P still hold NP (assuming
P⊂NP) to be more computable than the complements class co-NP. So in the sense of
this paper, NP becomes their extended touchstone for abstract computation. Results on
parallel computing are discussed below. (4) Moving beyond current technology, logi-
cians and mathematicians explore in$nitary computations, 16 real number machines, 17
and models for relativistic computation. 18
4. Six approaches to computability with lack of uniformity
Uniformity is a frequent phenomenon, but not ubiquitous; when it fails, as in pseu-
dorecursive theories, one can often view that failure as a near success instead. It be-
comes an indicator of intermediate potential, a middle ground, a tertium quid. In the
examples we have seen, a theory T =
⋃
n∈N Tn has a given target complexity, but all
the Tn have some lower $xed complexity. Equally important, in each setting there are
similar T in which some Tn has complexity equivalent to T . For example, classical
embeddings of a TM in a $nitely based equational theory will usually require only a
handful or so of variables. For these, T11 is already likely to be equivalent to T , which
may be recursive, or not. More generally, T and all Tn may have the same complexity,
or there may be a number k such that the Ti (i6k) have one complexity, and the
Tj (j¿k) and T have a higher complexity—a complexity break. These then are the
extrema for which our pseudorecursive theories and analogues introduced below hold
the middle ground. To provide terminology for this, we take mediate computability to
mean T has higher complexity than all the Tn. 19 The term does not mean there must
be “mediate computers.” We now turn to concrete approaches to mediate computability
at diGerent complexities and for diGerent computation models.
4.1. Pseudorecursive and decidable theories (extension)
This solves the problem in 3.1 of a required Tarski procedure by assuming the
problem can itself be abstracted as the answer and studying the consequences of this
commitment. In other words, we propose pseudorecursiveness not as a classi$cation
of pathologies (although it can work that way), but as an extension of computability
pseudorecursiveness for $nitely based equational theories is itself the new notion of
decidability. As mentioned earlier, this is a hallowed pattern in mathematics.
Here, the adoption of problem as solution is unsettling, for it reduces the Tarski
question to a de$nitional tautology. This is not a satisfying conclusion even if it turns
16 Hamkins et al. [20] extend the time resource for TMs from the natural to the ordinal numbers.
17 Blum et al. [4] extend both decidability and P/NP to real and complex numbers.
18 Hogarth [22,23] and Etesi et al. [16] discuss relativistic TMs and decision methods.
19 It is possible that the complexities of the Tn have that of T as a limit. Examples are easily constructed
by taking X =
⋃
Xn, with the complexities of the Xn below but approaching that of X , and then encoding
Xn with n variables in the manner of the proof of Theorem 4.6 below. Such examples are beyond the scope
of the current article.
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out to be formally useful. More curiously, it has the consequence of creating hyper-
computation by de$nition. This is mentioned in [50] and discussed further in Section 5
below. 20
The examples below will mitigate the oGense by showing reasonable and rigorous
cases of mediate computability in other contexts—some smaller and feasible, others
grander and fantastic. Although not discussed further here, for each case there are
similar T with the complexity break described above. In other words, mediate com-
putability is a proper notion in each setting.
4.2. Polynomial time vs. NPC and NC (specialization)
The $rst result concerns a theory that is nondeterministic-polynomial-time complete
(NPC). Let W be an NPC subset of N . The constructions that led to the $nite pseu-
dorecursive base 1 (see Section 1 above) can be applied to W instead of the nonre-
cursive r.e. set X . The resulting equational theory will be P-reducible to W . Together
with Theorem 1.2, this yields the following example.
Theorem 4.1 (Wells [51] Theorem 4.1). There is a ,nite base NPC for an equational
theory of semigroups with additional unary operations and distinguished elements such
that Th(NPC)∈NPC, but for all n∈N , Thn(NPC)∈P.
In Theorem 4.1, the set of NPC problems can be replaced with other subrecursive
complexities higher than P, such as exponential time, NP space, superexponential time,
etc. Moreover, we can go below P, if NC⊂P (NC problems are decidable in poly-
logarithmic time on a polynomial number of parallel processors; see [19] for this and
other terminology).
Theorem 4.2. There is a ,nite base PC for an equational theory of semigroups
with additional unary operations and distinguished elements such that Th(PC) is
P-complete, but for all n∈N , Thn(PC)∈NC.
Proof. In fact, in Theorem 1.1, for any r.e. set X ⊂N , Th(1X ) is NC-equivalent to X ,
and all of the n-variable layers Thn(1X ) are in NC with bounded exponents, because
fan-in is constant for the underlying TM and the polynomial bounds in the proof of
Theorem 1.2 are all cubic. Now choose a P-complete problem Q and let PC =1Q.
The resulting theory Th(PC) will be NC-equivalent to Q, while the layers Thn(PC)
will be in NC.
4.3. K-sequential vs. K-parallel computing (alteration)
This approach concerns a novel distinction between sequential and parallel comput-
ing; see [51].
20 Note that even if we reject this easy extension and its consequence of hypercomputation, $nitely based
pseudorecursive theories still represent mediate computability among r.e. equational theories.
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De#nition 4.3. By a K-sequential computation we shall mean a TM operating in
KalmVar elementary time. Ackermann’s function A(m; n; p)—recursive but not primitive
recursive—may be characterized by
A(m; n; 0) = m+ n;
A(m; n+ 1; p+ 1) = A(m; A(m; n; p+ 1); p);
(m; n; p¿ 0);
with two special cases
A(m; 0; 1) = 0;
A(m; 0; p) = 1;
(m¿ 0; p¿ 2):
Ackermann’s diagonal function Acd(n)=A(n; n; n) is obviously recursive but also
fails to be primitive recursive. A function (or set) is K-parallelizable iG it can be
computed in KalmVar elementary time T by TMs operating simultaneously, sequentially,
but not necessarily independently, where the number of machines grows as Acd(T ).
Acd and A are K-parallelizable and not K-sequential.
Let NSP be the class of K-parallelizable problems that are not K-sequential, and let
Ksq be the class of K-sequential problems.
Theorem 4.4 (Wells [51] Theorem 4.4). There is a ,nite base NSP for an equational
theory of semigroups with additional unary operations and distinguished elements such
that Th(NSP)∈NSP, but for all n∈N , Thn(NSP)∈Ksq.
4.4. Higher degrees and enhanced TMs (relativization and alteration)
If we forego the $nite equational bases of previous constructions, then there are
pseudorecursive theories of every degree of unsolvability. Of course, mediate com-
putability now depends on oracular TMs. These theories will exceed the power of any
$xed oracular machine.
De#nition 4.5. A square-zero semigroup satis$es xx≈yy≈ zxx≈ xxz; the square of
every element is zero. In these, we can take yy as the zero term. Tarski has pointed out
that these equations are equivalent to the single equation xx≈yyy. A unary operation
h on such a semigroup is nilpotent iG h(h(x))≈yy holds.
Theorem 4.6 (Wells [47] Theorem 10.7 and Corollary 10.8). Let Y be any nonrecur-
sive subset of N . There exists an in,nite base 2 for a pseudorecursive variety of
commutative square-zero semigroups with countably many additional nilpotent unary
operations, such that 2≡1 Y (or if Y is r.e., then 2 can be a recursive base) and
Th(2)≡btt Y . In addition, all word problems for the variety are solvable but not
uniformly solvable.
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We can combine the techniques used for constructing 1 of Theorem 1.1 and 2
to achieve $nite types. Recall that a variety is locally ,nite iG all its $nitely generated
algebras are $nite.
Theorem 4.7 (Wells [47] Theorem 10.9). Let Y be any nonrecursive subset of N .
There exists an in,nite base 3 for a locally ,nite pseudorecursive variety of ex-
panded square-zero semigroups with one unary nilpotent operation and two distin-
guished elements such that 3≡1 Y (better, if Y is r.e., then 3 can be recursive)
and Th(3)≡1 Y . Th(3) also has the property that all word problems for the va-
riety are solvable but not uniformly solvable.
4.5. Ordinal time and inductive TMs (relativization and alteration)
The pattern of the last example extends to ordinal-time TMs [20] and m-recursive
structured-memory inductive TMs [7] in the following way.
For any ordinal , let Lord be the class of languages A ⊆ N (encoded as binary
strings, say) such that there is an ordinal-time TM that decides A in  time, but no
ordinal-time TM decides A in less than  time.
For every k ∈N , let Lindk be the class of languages A ⊆ N such that there is a
k-recursive inductive TM that decides A, but no j-recursive inductive TM with j¡k
decides A. By [7], Lindm is nonempty for in$nitely many m ∈ N . Moreover, we know
from [7] that m-recursive inductive TMs can decide all languages in Ym ∪
∏
m. We
also observe that Lindm ∩ Ym+1 ⊆
∏
m+1 by induction, and this means L
ind
m ⊇ Ym −
∏
m,
which is nonempty for all m ∈ N .
Theorem 4.8. For all limit ordinals !, such that Lord! is nonempty, and for all m∈N ,
there are equational bases ord! and 
ind
m for varieties of commutative square-zero
semigroups with countably many additional nilpotent unary operations such that
Th(ord! ) ∈ Lord! ;
Th(indm ) ∈ Lindm ;
but for all n∈N , Thn(ord! ) and Thn(indm ) are recursive—in fact, they are in P.
Proof. Let Y be an arbitrary language in one of the L sets. The $rst conclusions are
corollaries of the construction in Theorem 4.6 because the coding of the set Y in
the equations in 2 is so direct. Because Theorem 1.2 covers Theorems 4.6–7, the
n-variable layers are in P.
4.6. Real computation (alteration)
As noted in Example 2.11 in [51], membership in the Mandelbrot set M can be char-
acterized by using the iterated function based on fc(z)= z2 +c for c∈C. This iteration
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is commonly presented as a chain of equations; whether c lies in M is determined by
the iteration on 0. Let z0(c)= z0 = 0; then
z1 = z20 + c;
z2 = z21 + c;
z3 = z22 + c;
· · ·
zi+1 = z2i + c;
· · · :
If the |zi| are bounded—that is, if {zi : i∈N} is included in a disk of radius r cen-
tered at the origin (r=4 suUces)—then c∈M . Using constant-length expressions and
restricting the number of variables available is equivalent to an escape-time algorithm
for charting M . Although these equations are de$nitions, not identities, 21 we see that
if $nitely many zi are used, the result is decidable in the sense of Blum et al. [4], but
if all the zi are available, the result is undecidable.
We can now improve the analogy with examples of mediate computability if we
consider the complement of M , which is semidecidable only.
Theorem 4.9. For n∈N , let
Bn = {c ∈ C: |zn(c)|¿ 4};




is a union of decidable sets that fails to be decidable; i.e., the union is not uniformly
decidable.
Here is a rough parallel with Theorem 4.1 for PR and NPCR where R is a ring and
we use unit cost (see [4] for notation and de$nitions). Instead of universal equations or
laws, we consider the existential problem: $nding roots. But the number of variables
remains the parameter of interest. For n∈N , with some abuse of notation, let
HNn=R= {S : S is a $nite set of polynomials with coeUcients in R
and variables v0; : : : ; vn−1 that have a simultaneous zero over R};
4-FEASn=R= {f : f is a degree-4 polynomial with coeUcients in R
and variables v0; : : : ; vn−1 that has a zero over R};
21 In fact, if the zi are represented by unary function symbols and all c∈C are individual constants, then
the de$nitions are identities. Or we could use individual constants zci (i∈N; c∈C). With unary symbols for
norm and negation, we can express |a|64 as 4+−|a|= |4+−|a||. Despite a form of mediate computability
given in the next result, we $nd no pseudorecursive theory here, for the number of variables is irrelevant.









Theorem 4.10. Let the ring R be one of Z¡ (integers with order), R¡ (real numbers
with order), or C (complex numbers). For all n∈N ,
HNn=R; 4-FEASn=R ∈ PR;
but
HN=R ∈ NPCR; 4-FEAS=Z¡ ∈ NPCZ¡; 4-FEAS=R¡ ∈ NPCR¡:
Proof. Indeed, the P results are obvious. See Proposition 4.3 and Theorem 4.1 in [4]
for the NP-complete results. It is important to note that 4-FEAS=Z¡ (and so HN=Z¡)
is not decidable by the recursive unsolvability of diophantine equations (Hilbert’s 10th
problem [32]); thus, PZ¡ =NPZ¡ . On the other hand, HN=R¡ (and so 4-FEAS=Z¡)
and HN=C are decidable by Tarski’s results [42]; according to [4], the questions
PR¡ =NPR¡? and PC =NPC? are open.
It is likely that there are more direct analogues of pseudorecursive equational theories
that have similar mediate real and complex computability.
5. Hypercomputation by #at; conclusions
Among the approaches to mediate computability given in Section 4, only 4.1 results
in hypercomputation—and then only if we understand decidability to be implemented
by some mechanizable decision procedure. Questions arise: what are the new machines?
what are their computations in deciding these newly decidable problems? We could rely
on previously mentioned models, such as Burgin’s inductive TMs [6], or in$nitistic
machines, or oracular machines. We could rely on the graded strength of some of
these models to match degree hierarchies of pseudorecursive theories. But these are easy
answers that do not explicate or justify assigning computability as a special attribute
of $nitely based pseudorecursive theories. In short, we will not have new computer
models until we have distinctive properties of the newly decidable theories.
What can distinguish $nitely based pseudorecursive theories as decision problems?
Why might they be more decidable than other r.e. nonrecursive theories, problems,
sets, or relations? Why not extend a similar claim of decidability to at least any r.e.
equational theory that is the union of an in$nite, not uniform family of in$nite nested
(or disjoint) recursive subsets (and every r.e. theory, language, and set is 22)? If we
22 The easiest decomposition is to choose a nest of increasingly larger $nite subsets whose union is the
original set. By $at, every $nite set is recursive. One may argue that this decree is no less arti$cial than
declaring a pseudorecursive theory to be computable.
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instead restrict ourselves to just a few theories, or to a single one, how do we make
a natural or useful choice? When presented with these questions (and more), Tarski
claimed that the number of variables that indexes the family Tn for a $nitely based
pseudorecursive theory T is an innocuous parameter that informally supports a uni-
form decision procedure for T . Formalizing this and understanding it precisely may be
equivalent (see [48]).
The degree results of [47] show that pseudorecursive theories as “Sat” sets are
in fact not special from the point of view of classical recursive function theory. In
other words, if we admit all $nitely based pseudorecursive theories as computable sets
of strings, then we have to accept all r.e. sets as computable. Thus we invite TMs
with halting-problem oracles. We conclude that more structure is required to keep
these newly decidable theories special. We can attempt an abstracted characterization
that will preserve the recursive properties of the theories and some of their structure
in order to separate the results from ordinary r.e. sets. An initial eGort is described
in [52].
So what do we gain by this decreed hypercomputation? In order to pursue the
problem-as-solution method, we $rst need to know the properties expected to be invari-
ant or at least desirable on moving to the larger domain of decidability. For example,
in introducing rational numbers, such as 35 to solve 3÷ 5, we desire multiplication to
distribute over addition.
Favored behavior could be derived from properties of the varieties such as operations,
composition, and closure. Some general algebraic results are included in [47] and others
will appear, but so far they oGer no light on this issue.
In another direction, we could lift the machine properties embedded in the constructed
equational bases (see Theorem 1.1) to adduce or induce detailed inherited mechanical
structure at the decision problem level. This largely arti$cial bootstrapping threatens to
be either trivial or circular.
A third path is to look at other logical theories and sets of sentences. More dis-
tant patterns lacking uniformity may be inspiring. For instance, the constants used at
Theorem 4.9 seem as innocuous as variables, and the existential sentences of Theorem
4.10 treat variables equitably. Properties from other logical situations such as these
may suggest useful invariants.
Finally, satisfying the quest for a naturally occurring pseudorecursive variety—one
motivated by math or computing—might also broaden our appreciation and enthusiasm
for the kind of structures and problems declared decidable. The notion of mediate
computability might itself become more natural.
So far, there has emerged no concrete extension of computing models correspond-
ing to the extension of decidability to $nitely based pseudorecursive theories. Other
examples in Section 4 do demonstrate considerable scope for usable, nontrivial (if un-
natural) failures of uniformity that could be taken as a kind of “decidability” between
the extrema native to each of those domains (and more). But these results on mediate
computability also fail to inspire new machines.
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An impasse has progressed but has not resolved. It is plausible that Tarski meant
something signi$cant by his declaration. The ontological claim that middle ground
thereby exists between recursive and r.e. sets—between TMs and oracular TMs—is
less compelling. I do not think the current impasse is what Tarski meant. But it is a
place to start.
Postscript
Many impasses are called gaps. Gaps appear in math, in programs, in memories.
Stub-outs, gaAes in print, bugs, blocks, holes in proofs, blanks, GPFs—all are places
for mysterious, even Divine action. If gaps are closed, things get more reliable, more
complete, better. Or do they? Although we need to be careful in formal or rigorous
work, intuition may require and thrive on incompleteness. The London Underground
exhorts, “Mind the gap.” “Mine the gap” is also good advice.
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